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Die DFG-Kollegforscher_innengruppe „Landnahme, Beschleunigung, Aktivierung. Dynamik und (De-) 
Stabilisierung moderner Wachstumsgesellschaften“ – kurz: „Kolleg Postwachstumsgesellschaften“ – 
setzt an der soziologischen Diagnose multipler gesellschaftlicher Umbruchs- und Krisenphänomene an, 
die in ihrer Gesamtheit das überkommene Wachstumsregime moderner Gesellschaften in Frage stellen. 
Die strukturellen Dynamisierungsimperative der kapitalistischen Moderne stehen heute selbst zur Dispo-
sition: Die Steigerungslogik fortwährender Landnahmen, Beschleunigungen und Aktivierungen bringt 
weltweit historisch neuartige Gefährdungen der ökonomischen, ökologischen und sozialen Reproduk-tion 
hervor. Einen Gegenstand in Veränderung – die moderne Wachstumsgesellschaft – vor Augen, zielt das 
Kolleg auf die Entwicklung von wissenschaftlichen Arbeitsweisen und auf eine Praxis des kritischen Dia-
logs, mittels derer der übliche Rahmen hochgradig individualisierter oder aber projektförmig beschränkter 
Forschung überschritten werden kann. Fellows aus dem In- und Ausland suchen gemeinsam mit der 
Jenaer Kollegforscher_innengruppe nach einem Verständnis gegenwärtiger Transformationsprozesse, 
um soziologische Expertise in jene gesellschaftliche Frage einzubringen, die nicht nur die europäische 
Öffentlichkeit in den nächsten Jahren bewegen wird: Lassen sich moderne Gesellschaften auch anders 
stabilisieren als über wirtschaftliches Wachstum? 
Antonio Loffredo 
 
From Polarisation to Precarisation of the Italian Labour Market 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Das Papier untersucht die „unendliche Reform“ im Feld individueller und kollektiver Arbeitsbeziehungen in den 
letzten zehn Jahren in Italien. Es versucht dabei die Verbindung zwischen juristischen Interventionen in das 
Arbeitsrecht, die Fragmentierung von Unternehmen und die Herstellung größerer Ungleichheit zwischen 
ArbeitnehmerInnen herauszuheben, deren Wichtigkeit in den Jahren der Austeritätspolitik deutlich zu spüren 
war. Aus dieser Perspektive fokussiert der Autor auf die Art und Weise, auf die der gesetzliche Rahmen die 
Polarisierung des italienischen Arbeitsmarkts ursprünglich als ein Resultat der EU-Politiken im Bereich Arbeit 
und Wirtschaft ermöglicht und dann in den letzten Jahren eine allgemeine Prekarisierung der ökonomischen 
und gesetzlichen Schutzmechanismen für ArbeitnehmerInnen sogar gefördert hat.  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The essay explores the evolution of the "never ending reform" in the field of individual and collective labour 
relations in Italy during the past decade, trying to underline the connection between legal interventions in 
labour law, the fragmentation of businesses and the creation of bigger inequalities among employees, whose 
importance has been clearly felt in the years of austerity policies. From this perspective, the author focuses 
on how the legal framework, as a result of the EU occupational and economic governance, has initially allowed 
a certain polarisation of the Italian labour market and then, in the most recent years, even fostered a 
generalised precarisation of economic and legal protections provided for workers. 
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The Italian labour market shows a clear connection between adjustments to Labour Law, fragmentation of 
businesses and the creation of greater inequalities among employees, whose importance has been clearly felt 
in the years of the austerity policies (Palomeque 1984, 134). Moreover, the workforce polarisation, meaning by 
this the existence of a segmented labour market divided at least into two large segments (on the “social” role of 
labour market see Solow 1994), one for workers having a particular specialisation required by enterprises and 
another one for those less skilled, is by now an evident reality, as has been underlined by many OECD reports 
on Italian employment (since OECD 2004). It is not unreasonable to assume that this trend has received strong 
support even from the current legal framework and, particularly, from the most relevant Italian Labour Law 
reforms of the new millennium: the “Biagi Reform” (Legislative Decree 276/2003), the “Collegato lavoro” (Act 
183/2010), the “Fornero Reform” (Act 92/2012) and the “Jobs act” (Act 183/2014 and Legislative Decrees n. 22, 
23, 80, 81, 148, 149, 150 and 151 of 2015).  
The legal framework concerning the Labour Law from 2003 until today has initially allowed and even fostered a 
certain polarisation of economic and legal protections provided for the different kinds of employees, also based 
on the professional skills of workers (Loffredo 2012, 111). This polarisation has resulted in significant differences 
in protections, especially for those workers who were hired in the new millennium, for various reasons, among 
which it is worth citing for their consequences on the precariousness of the Italian workforce: a) the fragmentation 
of enterprises and the creation of mono-specialised businesses after the outsourcing reforms of 2003; b) the 
regulation of some contractual typologies in a more precarious way, acceptable almost exclusively to unskilled 
workers having low bargaining power or to some social clusters or categories towards which they are traditionally 
directed; c) the increase of “subjective causes” to conclude some contractual typologies characterised by less 
legal and wage protections, mostly used by enterprises operating in labour intensive sectors; d) the use of 
professional training in the employment contract mostly in an occupational key through the reduction of workers 
protections, which has resulted in the debasement of the professional situation inside an apprenticeship, e) the 
attack on trade unions rights; and, finally, f) the unfair dismissals reform. So, in a way it is possible to say that 
the major finding of this paper is that these reforms of the legal framework helped to polarize the labour market 
and thereby led to its increasing precarisation in different periods, starting in 2003 (coinciding with the so called 
Biagi Act) and continuing through a deepening in 2010, ultimately finding its conclusion with the government of 
Matteo Renzi and the reform of dismissals. 
 
 
1. Outsourcing and the fragmentation of enterprises  
Starting from the effects of new rules about outsourcing (Speziale 2010, 5) in the Italian labour market, it is 
simple to note how this situation is different in comparison to that regarding Labour Law in the past century, in 
which the cases of decentralised production were rare. Act 1369/1960 was a symbol of that Labour Law, 
forbidding the employer to contract the execution of mere work performances and punishing this phenomenon 
with the establishment of an employment relationship with the real employer-user and not with the formal 
employer. For this purpose, the legislation introduced two principles: the joint liability between the formal and 
the real employer for credits claimed by workers and the principle of equal treatment between the client’s and 
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contractor’s workers (Costa 2016). Article 85 of the Legislative Decree 276/2003 abrogated the latter principle 
which resulted in the devastating effect of creating two labour markets having different economic and legal 
conditions. The first one is for clients, with standard employment relationships stable and more protected; the 
other one is for contractors, which are under the economic authority of clients, often operating in labour intensive 
sectors and low-skills sectors with. The workers of these sectors are often hired with precarious contracts, the 
duration of which can coincide with the duration of the contracts between clients and contractors (Scarpelli 1999, 
353). In this way the labour market has been polarised resulting in the perverse effect that a commercial contract 
concluded between two enterprises influences directly the initial duration or the termination of the employment 
contract between the contractor and the employee, bypassing the dismissal regulation. 
This kind of outsourcing manages to guarantee a general decrease in the transaction costs, including the ones 
connected to the trade unions presence in the enterprise, by sharing them with other businesses through which 
strong collaborative relations are established; indeed the new formulas of outsourcing allow the contractor to 
maintain substantial control and to exercise their powers on the decentralised parties (De Simone 1995), 
although they have autonomy in management and in responsibility, maintaining their own specialisation in a 
certain activity. 
Therefore, if Act 1369/1960 could be considered the symbol of a Labour Law aimed at protecting the workers, 
Legislative Decree 276/2003, which has completely abrogated Act 1369/1960, is the real paradigm of a law in 
which the organisational needs of the enterprises have prevailed strongly over the protection of workers. Finally, 
as we will see later, Act 183/2014, the so called Jobs Act of Renzi’s government, is the clearest example of a 
precarised Labour Law in terms of salaries, stability and the power of employees and of trade unions. 
Even the transfer of undertakings reform can be read in the same way. The modification of Article 2112 of the 
Italian Civil Code, also carried forward by Article 32 of Legislative Decree 276/2003, specified the notion of the 
“part of undertaking”, stating that a functional, independent division is “an organised economic activity, identified 
by the transferor and the transferee at the moment of the transfer”. This part of the regulation results in a serious 
risk of abuses, allowing the use of this regulatory scheme both to break enterprises into small-sized firms and 
to cut some non-profitable branches without having to follow the collective dismissals regulation (Gallino 2005). 
Finally, the introduction of both temporary agency work and staff leasing in 2003, as well as the Renzi’s 
government reform of 2014 (the first step of the “Jobs Act”) that has liberalised temporary agency work, allows 
enterprises to fragment their productive organisations and their legal status too (Corazza 2004), using whichever 
scheme they prefer. 
The principle of economic dependence between two enterprises could potentially be a useful tool to establish 
labour relationships formally belonging to contractors with clients and to try to reduce the proliferation of 
substantial subordinate enterprises, inside of which these second-class workers are mostly employed because 
of their low skills, even though they have the same dignity and deserve the same respect from the legal system. 
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2. Atypical contracts and disadvantaged groups in the labour market 
The “neverending labour market reform”, which began in the ’80s and has modified the rationale of Italian Labour 
Law1, has had devastating effects mostly on workers who are on its periphery, especially young people, 
immigrants and women. 
Since 2003, the Italian legislator has created an enormous variety of contracts (in a given moment 43 different 
employment contracts existed simultaneously); however, the Legislative Decree 81/2015 about contractual 
typologies concerns the whole area of precariousness and tends towards a formal reduction in the number of 
contracts but, on the other hand, seeks to promote further flexible rules in favour of enterprises in order to 
accomplish the Troika austerity policies. 
Concerning that, it is worth outlining a peculiarity of Italian Labour Law, namely the idea according to which self-
employed workers do not need the legislator’s balancing activity, because they would not be in a situation of 
contractual imbalance in a legal and economic sense. Thus, Labour Law has chosen to give direct protection to 
employees in a prevalent and exclusive way ignoring atypical contractual relations. This approach has certainly 
fostered the birth of many “bogus self-employed”, who have represented for a long period one of the favourite 
ways for the Italian entrepreneurs to avoid Labour Law rules and protections. 
Workers involved in this phenomenon are often the most disadvantaged groups in the labour market, namely 
those employed with coordinated and continuative collaboration contracts, in many occasions confused with 
employees (Revelli 1997, 85) because of the broad and distorted use of them by enterprises which have 
entrusted these “parasubordinate workers” with many functions previously assigned to employees, obtaining 
benefits concerning wages, social security and legal regulation. When the abuse of this regulation scheme  
evident, it started a debate concerning which kind of legislative action would be more suitable to contain the 
phenomenon2. Legislative Decree 276/2003 modified the normative situation establishing “project work” (Pallini 
2006 and Santoro Passarelli-Pellacani 2009) which, even if it was inserted with the aim of extending some 
protections provided for employees to parasubordinate workers, has been an ineffective regulation both for the 
generality of the definition of the “project”, which does not prevent simple avoidances, and for the limited extent 
of protections. Furthermore, the mentioned Legislative Decree of June 2015 about contractual typologies aims 
to erase these very few protections introduced with the project work, to bring back the whole category of 
parasubordinate workers to the coordinated and continuative collaborations area (Perulli 2015, 16) and so to 
enter a more precarious situation in terms of rights. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 It is possible to talk of a “permanent” Labour Law reform not only in times of austerity also in other countries of the European Union, 
(Palomeque  2001, 9). 
2 Italy is second only to Greece in Europe for self-employed workers in 2017, with 21% of the workforce according to Eurostat data. 
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2.1 Part-time and precarious jobs not just for women 
A part-time contract, if chosen voluntarily, can represent an effective instrument of flexibility for all the parties 
involved, since it allows the employee to have a better conciliation of work and personal life. However, in times 
of austerity, a part-time contract has also become a precarious contract. From its very first introduction it was 
mainly used for two categories of workers: young people still living in their parents’ household and hence not in 
need of a full salary, and women, who are often required to work and look after the house and children. In recent 
years however, the dramatic decrease in full-time job offers and the consequent reduction of the actual 
employees’ power of choice have given rise to a sharp increase in the use of part-time contracts amongst adult 
men as well. 
The most significant aspects of the legal regulation of part-time contracts that have been enforced more and 
more frequently by the employers are the possibility of extending work hours above the agreed hours — but still 
below full-time (the so-called supplementary work time) — and changing the distribution of working hours 
throughout the week. The former has been extensively reformed on many occasions, from 2003 to the 
aforementioned Legislative Decree 81/2015 (Zoppoli L. 2015, 13), and the changes have been mostly beneficial 
to enterprises. Legislative Decree 276/2003 has significantly amended the “flexible” and “elastic” clauses: the 
flexible ones refer to the possibility of changing the temporal allocation of work performance, while the elastic 
ones concern the possible increase in the maximum duration of work per day. Such clauses, whose permissibility 
had been banned by the Constitutional Court during the previous regulation, must be agreed by both parties and 
require the explicit consent of the employee; however, in the absence of collective agreements regulating the 
subject, employers and employees may also adopt those clauses (De Luca Tamajo, Rusciano, L. Zoppoli 2004, 
especially the essays by A. Zoppoli, Alessi, Bavaro), whose concrete activation is subject to only two 
requirements: a notice period from the employer and the worker’s right to a defined compensation. 
Therefore, the increase of part-time contracts3, not only amongst women and young people, does not come as 
a surprise as it allows the employer to have a broad management of part-time workers, who are actually 
employed for a number of hours that quite frequently are very close to those worked by their full-time colleagues 
and who thus lose power on the conciliation of work and personal life. 
 
2.2 Professional training as an instrument for occupational policies 
During the ’80s and ’90s, Italy saw a wide spread use of professional training contracts. The key factor of their 
success can be easily explained by their ability to allow the flexibility of labour costs (L. Zoppoli 1998, 825). 
Professional training contracts, the use of which were also supported by the government’s policy of incentives, 
were an instrument of labour policy that made the transition from temporary to permanent employment easier, 
mostly for young people. So, they were used mainly with an occupational function, which also had the effect of 
demeaning the “professional” function of training, making it an effective tool to undermine some of the workers’ 
rights (Napoli 1998, 51 and Loffredo 2012, 183). 
                                                 
3 According to the Eurostat data, the increase of part-time workers in Italy is quite surprising, moving from 17.5% in 2006 to 29.6% in 
2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00159&plugin=1 
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Currently, the apprenticeship is the only professional training contract left in the labour market. It underwent 
various stages of reform: first the radical reform of Legislative Decree 276/2003, it then suffered various 
“adjustments” firstly in the Refunded Act in 2011, then in new reforms in 2012 and 2014 and, finally, in the 
complete reform of the labour market included in the mentioned Legislative Decree 81/2015 about precarious 
contracts.  
All Italian governments of the third millennium have focused on the issue of extending the use of apprenticeship 
and, since the 2003 reform, have developed forms of contracts increasingly more beneficial to the needs of 
businesses. The Legislative Decree 81/2015 could have been an opportunity not only for a real simplification of 
the number of existing employment contracts but also to make the function of said contracts clearer, allocating 
a specific function to each one of them and avoiding unnecessary “competition” between contracts. 
Unfortunately, the Legislative Decree does not follow this direction and, in regard to the apprenticeship, it 
formally reiterates the contract’s double function: professional training, on one hand, and employment, on the 
other. Nevertheless, the legislative regulation clarifies that the latter is the most relevant function, as shown by 
the rules focusing on business incentives rather than on training.  
However, after the so-called Jobs Act of Renzi’s government, the apprenticeship suffered  “competition” from 
other types of contracts that are much more profitable for businesses4. The main advantages of hiring with an 
apprenticeship contract have always been the exclusion of the apprentice from appearing in the company’s 
number of employees and the free dismissal at the end of the training period. Nonetheless, the reform of Article 
18 of Statuto dei Lavoratori and the complete liberalisation of fixed term contracts directly through the company 
or through agencies make both these regulatory incentives less and less attractive for employers. Moreover, the 
incentives on social security contributions have always been the most attractive point for businesses in hiring 
apprentices but, due to a supposed lower productivity of a worker who must undergo a training period, 
businesses can also pay an apprentice up to two levels less than the other workers. This reduced salary is 
confirmed by the Legislative Decree 81/2015 but becomes absolutely unacceptable because of the complete 
cancellation of the obligations for employers to pay the apprentices during external (public) training, on the one 
hand, and for apprentices to pay up to 10% of their wage for the hours of training performed within the company, 
on the other hand. This provision constitutes a real insult to the dignity of apprentices, who must pay for 
professional training out of their own pockets, even when the training is inside the enterprise and often “looks 
like normal work” because it is difficult to control its real execution.  
The only possible way to make sense of the apprentice work contract would be through enhancing the training, 
as it is the only aspect in which there is no “competition” with other labour contracts, which would give a sign of 
a real change in employment policies towards quality employment and a low-cost workforce. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Actually, in 2015 the percentage of apprentices had decreased by about 8% and their number was about 410,000, 15% of the workers 
between 15 and 29 years, according to the public institute of professional training, Isfol http://www.isfol.it/comunicati/archivio/14-
luglio-2016-lapprendistato-in-italia  
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3. The breakdown of stability principle in workplaces 
The fixed term contract became relevant in the Italian legal system only in 2001; before then, it had been used 
exclusively in the cases provided by law, which was when the employer needed a worker whose task was not 
permanently necessary for the enterprise. Therefore, the rate of temporary employment in Italy had rarely 
exceeded 8%, far below many countries of the European Union. 
The 2001 reform (Legislative Decree 368/2001) was the first Act of Berlusconi’s government in the area of 
Labour Law, which clearly demonstrates its determination to break down job stability. The decree, which 
amended the fixed term contracts and introduced a general clause that would allow a temporary contract 
whenever there are “technical, productive, organisational or substitutive reasons” (Carinci 2005), caused a 
remarkable increase in the number of temporary workers, whose dedication to the company is more strongly 
guaranteed by their hope of obtaining a permanent contract than any legal obligation could. Legislative Decree 
368/2001 is undoubtedly a “wrong” transposition of Directive 1999/70 (Zappalà 2001, 633), which was a 
European collective agreement signed by social parties aimed at preventing the abuse of temporary contracts. 
Nevertheless, this reform did not completely meet the expectations of the employers since it had some legal 
problems addressed in court5 that resulted in punishment for the abuse of the fixed term contracts even in that 
so flexible regulation (Speziale 2003, 225). Basically for that reason, the government of Matteo Renzi converted 
the fixed term contracts into a sort of long trial period, which allows free temporary employment for the first three 
years of the contract, during which period dismissal with no reasons needed is permitted. This clause likely 
breaks the rules of EU Directive 1999/70 and the principles concerning unfair dismissals. 
This new trend in Italian Labour Law, which aims at a complete breakdown of stability within the workplace as a 
right and as a symbol, was a clear consequence of austerity policies and is moving the Italian labour market 
from a situation of polarisation to another of extended precarisation (Lassandari 2015, 63)6; so, the rules on 
unfair dismissals could not be left untouched.  
The Italian system in this field grants workers protection mainly based on the size of the company7: the protection 
against unfair dismissals may be “real” or compensated by a monetary reparation. The so-called “real” protection 
applied to large and medium enterprises and it was guaranteed by “well known” Article 18 of Act 300/1970 
(commonly known as Statuto dei Lavoratori): it determined the reinstatement in the position as if the employment 
relationship had never been interrupted. The constitutional articles that the Constitutional Court considered as 
the basis of Article 18 were Articles 4 (the right to work) and 35 (protection of labour in all its forms and 
applications). In addition to the reinstatement, the worker was entitled to compensation, the cost of which was 
calculated in the unpaid wages the worker did not receive, beginning from the date of the dismissal until the 
actual reinstatement, including all social security contributions. In small businesses, protection against unlawful 
dismissals were less strong, where the employer could choose between “re-hiring” the worker (i.e. the dismissal 
is effective and should begin a new employment relationship) or a compensation determined in the judgment 
that may vary between 2.5 and 6 months of salary. In this area, where “real protection” did not apply, it was 
                                                 
5 The first judgement of the Corte di Cassazione on that regulation was n. 7468, 21/5/2002, in Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della 
Previdenza Sociale, 2003, II, p. 49. 
6 Precarisation is understood as a transformation from guaranteed, permanent employment to less well paid and more insecure jobs.  
7 It applies to enterprises employing more than 15 workers. 
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common to find a more precarious labour market with fewer protections, where workers were afraid to claim 
their rights and trade unions faced barriers of entrance. Article 18, beyond its specific applications, had an 
enormous importance in the political and academic debate as it represented a multiplier of rights: that is, without 
stable employment the workers do not claim their rights. For this basic reason, the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment 174/19728 acknowledged that only when there is a “real” protection against unfair dismissals can 
workers feel free to exercise their rights and to his end provided two different deadlines for the prescription of 
rights: during or at the conclusion of the employment relationship. 
There have been several attempts to reform the area of “real stability” and the most notable was carried out by 
the government of Berlusconi in 2002, which aimed to allow a suspension of the application of the rule for a 
certain period of time and in some areas of the country, especially in the southern regions of Italy where the rate 
of unemployment is remarkably higher. The trade union response was overwhelming; on March 23, 2002 one 
single union, the CGIL, organised a strike that brought to the streets of Rome more than 3 million people in 
defence of Article 18 and of the right of all workers to see their relationship guaranteed by a system that allows 
them to live as free citizens in the workplace. 
Another response to this attack against Article 18 was the referendum in 2003 which aimed to extend the “real” 
protection to workers employed in companies with less than 15 employees. The referendum did not reach the 
necessary quorum to make it valid but collected more than 10 million votes in favour, a political outcome that 
seemed to discourage any government from retrying a reform with the same purpose. 
Recognising these obstacles, as they had been seen previously, Berlusconi’s government sought other ways to 
achieve the same goal; by signing a certain number of Acts that applied a large scale liberalisation of many 
employment contracts (fixed term and part-time contracts, apprenticeship, “work project” and more) and that 
especially facilitated the abuse of contracts and subcontracts, Berlusconi’s policy has dramatically reduced the 
cases in which “real” protection applied, broadening the precarious market and creating a “reserve army” of 
workers. The choice of using the strength of weak ties9 has made the system more and more precarious, 
especially for new contracts, as it directly avoided modifying protections against unfair dismissals whilst reducing 
their effectiveness. 
Once the goal of creating a labour market where only few workers can effectively use their rights fully and a vast 
majority move between unemployment and precarious labour relationships had been achieved, the objective of 
the austerity policies was the reduction of protection against unlawful dismissal and, specifically, to remove 
almost completely the real stability. In the political and academic debate, Article 18 has always been considered 
an example of an anomaly in Italian Labour Law; however, it is rarely stressed that the real Italian anomaly issue 
on dismissals is the compensation provided to workers unlawfully dismissed in companies with less than 15 
employees and, not least, the absence of a general system of economic protection in cases of unemployment. 
Maybe the Italian problem has never been the “real” protection, in spite of what the employers’ associations and 
                                                 
8 In www.cortecostituzionale.it  
9 Mariucci 2003, 255 states that a precarious employment contract is a strong tie for a worker because he needs to work more and 
more to get a decent salary. 
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the guidelines of the European employment policies used to say, but the area where no real stability is applied, 
since the Italian economy is based on small enterprises. 
Recognising the impossibility for Berlusconi’s governments to formally amend Article 18, and despite having 
widely reduced its effectiveness, the European Union “strongly supported” the appointment of Mario Monti, a 
former Competition Commissioner in the EU, as Prime Minister of Italy in order to accomplish the austerity 
policies10. His government of technocrats made a vast Labour Law reform that, among other things, altered 
Article 18, reducing the possibility of the “real” protection to very few cases and facilitating the use of the objective 
dismissal by limiting the intervention of the judiciary. 
None of these measures, which had cut down the cases eligible of coactive reinstatement, seemed to be 
sufficient enough to meet the demands of the EU, and the first law reform contained in the so-called Jobs Act of 
the Renzi government proceeded to completely eliminate the sanction of reinstatement except for discriminatory 
dismissals. In all the other cases, it has introduced (Legislative Decree 23/2015) only a very low economic 
sanction, fixed by law and based on the seniority of the employee unlawfully dismissed (the so-called “increasing 
safeguard contract”, contratto a tutele crescenti) (Giubboni-Colavita 2017). 
This decision appears to be the final stage of a long journey that began in 2003 and has led the Italian 
employment system to be one of the most flexible in all of Europe both for hiring and dismissing. It is very 
important to highlight how this process panned out because, once it recognised the impossibility of making the 
reforms it required, the European Union itself intervened directly through a replacement of Italian democratic 
institutions to achieve an objective that European guidelines on employment had been requiring for more than 
a decade. Thanks to policies that have diminished the area of “real” stability and have pushed the Italian labour 
market to a new level of precariousness, it is clear that the EU’s request to modify the rule that was a symbol of 
workers’ rights in Labour Law had nothing to do with objectives of employment policies but was only driven by 
the “austerity obsession” to recover the loot of a robbery (Romagnoli 2009, 13): the license to fire freely. 
 
 
4. Trade unions in a precarised labour market 
The increasing expansion of precarious jobs and the polarisation of the Italian labour market determined a 
severe decline in terms of membership and representativeness of trade unions, even if there is no official data 
about it; the most representative among them tried to give a (late and not too effective) response to those 
problems through the creation of ad hoc structures for atypical workers, reaching an integration with “standard 
workers”, in order to create a common consciousness. The three major federations for atypical workers are Nidil 
(Cgil), Felsa (Cisl) and Uiltem.p@ (Uil). “Autonomous” trade unions (Cobas, Usb, Confsal, Cisal and so on) have 
“naturally” included atypical workers in their actions, with more radical positions, having some positive results; 
however, the peculiar legal framework of Italian industrial relations makes their lives especially complicated, and 
even more so under the effects of EU austerity policies. 
                                                 
10 As it was clearly shown by the “secret” letter sent the 29th of September of 2011 (and published by the Corriere della sera the 5th of 
October of the same year) by Mario Draghi and Jean Claude Trichet to the President Berlusconi. 
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The efforts of the unions are likely to be cancelled by any legislator who does not hide his lack of sympathy for 
them; the crisis of representativeness that trade unions are facing is, certainly, a consequence of the difficult 
economic period that we are living in and, at the same time, the absence of legislation regulating the exercise 
of the collective constitutional rights. Specifically, the constitutional model of collective bargaining (described in 
Article 39) and the exercise of the right to strike (Article 40) have not been developed by Italian legislation. The 
reasons are multiple but one of them worth pointing out has been trade unions’ “fear” of any public intervention 
in their organizations. However, this fear has a simple explanation: originating in the early fifties, they had just 
come out of the violent repression of twenty years of fascism.  
In the past century, this peculiar situation did not create major problems for trade union activity thanks to their 
strong representativeness; instead, the breakdown of trade unions’ unity over the last decade, promoted by 
almost all Italian governments of this period, combined with the effects of austerity policies, is now leading to 
cases of absolute confusion. This new political and social landscape makes it impossible to keep on accepting 
a system without legal rules to verify the representativeness (D’Antona 1998, 319) of trade unions because the 
major unions can even loose the right to representation in the company if the employer refuses to sign a 
collective agreement with them. That is exactly what happened in the conflict in Fiat that began after it acquired 
control of Chrysler. We should remember that Chrysler came from a troubled past and has been repeatedly on 
the brink of bankruptcy in recent decades. Being marginalized by the U.S. market, it was not surprising that 
when Barack Obama decided in 2009, after their bankruptcy, to bail out General Motors and Chrysler, no 
American business stepped forward to fix and re-launch Chrysler. An attempt was made by Daimler but, after 
losing several million dollars, it was forced to give up in 2007. When Fiat acquired control of Chrysler, it circulated 
the illusion that an Italian company had begun a “conquest of America”. A few years on, it is clear that the 
situation should be seen in the opposite sense, because the strategies used by Fiat in Italy are not taken from 
Italian industrial relations tradition, but, on the contrary, they derive directly from the U.S. The problem is that 
the importance of this company has spread the conflict to other enterprises and sectors all over the country (Ales 
2014). 
Fiat, using an authoritarian and undemocratic approach, decided to escape from the structure model of collective 
bargaining of the Italian industrial relations system regulated by the Protocollo of July 1993 and, simultaneously, 
from the model of union representation in the company. The most significant step of Fiat’s business strategy 
was to exit from the employer’s association with which it was affiliated (Federmeccanica/Confindustria). 
Therefore, as there are no obligations from a legal standpoint for an employer regarding whether and with whom 
to bargain collectively, Fiat has been released from contractual obligations and started a new era of collective 
agreements stipulated with only a few of the most representative unions, creating major conflict within the trade 
unions as well as sparking significant academic debate.  
A paradoxical consequence of existing Italian legislation involves FIOM members. Despite the fact that it is the 
most representative trade union both in the company and in the metal sector, the members of this union have 
lost the right to have representation unless FIOM signs the deal, because Article 19 of Statuto dei lavoratori 
guarantees this right only to trade unions that have signed a collective agreement applied within the company 
at any level (Ghera 2013, 155). Nevertheless, after the ruling of the Constitutional Court 231/2013, according to 
Article 19 of Statuto dei lavoratori, the most representative trade unions have the right to participate in the 
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negotiations for the conclusion of collective agreements and the right to have the peculiar prerogatives provided 
for in Title III of the Statuto dei lavoratori (A.Zoppoli 2011). 
 
4.1 Precarious jobs and atypical strikes 
This complicated social, political and legal situation was made even more difficult by austerity policies, as 
workers rights were further attacked, including the right to strike.  
The only statutory regulation about striking in Italy, until 1990 when Act 146 on conflict in essential services was 
approved, had been Article 40 of the Constitution, which states merely that “the right to strike has to be exercised 
according to the laws that regulate it”. The succinct formulation of Article 40, which asked for the intervention of 
the law combined with the silence of Italian legislative bodies on the matter, resulted in their being replaced by 
social partners, case law and scholars. So, we could say that the theory of the right to strike has been shaped 
through the dialogue between doctrine and case law, while collective agreements have focused on setting 
procedural requirements like no-strike clauses (A.Zoppoli 2006) and cooling-off periods.  
Thanks to this cooperation between scholars, judges and social parties, since the sixties the right to strike has 
been interpreted as an absolute, fundamental right of the worker to be exercised in a collective way for 
contractual or non-contractual reasons, including in the case of political and solidarity strikes. Specifically, 
“economic-political” strikes, which are economic in their content and political in their subject matter, fall within 
the exclusive competence of political power and have been regarded as a right by the Constitutional Court. 
There is a clear connection between Article 39 (freedom of association) and Article 40 (right to strike) of the 
Constitution, as Article 40 provides an important tool to make the freedom of association effective; nevertheless, 
the right to strike has no connection with the presence of a trade union in the company because the right to 
participate in a strike is an individual right regardless of membership in the union that has claimed the right 
(Loffredo 2008). At the same time, it is obvious that the absence of a trade union inside a company, as it 
happened to FIOM in the Fiat conflict, makes it much more difficult for them to organize collective actions (Liso 
2013, 166). 
Looking at the case law of the Constitutional Court, it can be said that in Italy, in the private sector, there are no 
legally binding procedural restrictions on collective action, and there are no real limitations on the objectives and 
content of the strike. The exercise of the right to strike has the sole effect on the employment relationship of a 
proportionate loss of pay; any other employer’s action against workers on strike is explicitly prohibited, including 
dismissals, which must be considered unfair, even if they are a consequence of an illegal strike in essential 
services. Article 28 of Statuto dei lavoratori provides these rules, stating that in the case of an action of the 
employer against strikers, trade unions may ask the labour judge for a summary injunction against the employer 
(according to Art. 28 of Statuto dei lavoratori). 
As we can see, lacking any statutory definition of rules on striking, judicial control has played a crucial role in 
defining the current regulatory framework of the right to strike; but, for the same reason, and perhaps under the 
influence of the European Court of Justice, in the future we might see changes of direction in jurisprudence in 
our definition and exercise of rules on striking.  
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The different approaches of Italian judges and the European Court of Justice on this point are clearly shown in 
the regulation of the conflict between the right to strike and market freedoms. A historical decision of the Corte 
di Cassazione of 1980, regarding the legality of “atypical” strikes (which are collective actions like intermittent 
strikes or strikes by groups, and so on), stated that in the constitutional framework there does not exist a notion 
of “typical” strike and that the notion of strikes has to be found in what is understood as such in practice in the 
common meaning in society. The first consequence of this decision was that “atypical” strikes fell within the 
scope of Article 40 of the Constitution and could not be declared illegal.  
The second consequence, which is particularly interesting when compared with the judgments of the European 
Court of Justice on strikes, was that any damage that the strike may cause to the enterprise’s production had to 
be considered legal. This judgment does not mean that in Italy the employer’s economic freedom is not protected 
against industrial action, because the Corte di Cassazione specified that the exercise of the right to strike should 
not infringe upon the right of the employers to resume productive activities once the strike is over (business 
productivity protected by Article 41 of the Constitution). The difference between the restriction inferred by Italian 
courts on the basis of Article 41 of the Constitution and the one inferred by European judges, for example in 
Laval and Viking cases, which in a way we can say opened the austerity era in Europe, is that the former 
concerns a pathological stage of a company’s life cycle, protecting its survival and its ability to remain on the 
market once the industrial dispute is over, whereas the latter concerns the physiological condition of a company’s 
life cycle, pertaining to the protection of its business and its freedom to operate in the market. According to the 
European Court, this interest may not be restricted either by a collective agreement, whose function is precisely 
to limit the exercise of the economic freedom of the employer, or by a strike.  
A paradigmatic example of what could happen to the right to strike in this new legal and political landscape is, 
once again, the Fiat conflict. In fact, the so-called “liability clause” of some collective agreements signed by Fiat 
with only two of the three most representative unions seems to have the intention of denying the right to strike 
to workers. Point 1 of the clause states that the breach of a single part of the collective agreement by trade 
unions releases the company from all the obligations contained in that agreement and in national collective 
bargaining. Point 2 states that even individual actions that violate the collective agreement, in whole or in part, 
have the same effect as point 1. 
This clause, in Fiat’s intentions, should have had the function of limiting the conflicts in the plant because it 
expressly individualizes sanctions for breaching part of the agreement; in these cases, according to Fiat’s 
interpretation of the clause, the company can consider itself released from its obligation to comply with every 
other clause of the collective agreement at the plant and national levels. The purpose of this clause is to avoid 
strikes on subjects regulated in the agreement, because the company knows that many workers and the most 
representative unions disagree with its contents (Santoro Passarelli 2017, 81).  
In my opinion, both clauses cannot reach the objective because, from the collective perspective (point 1), the 
clause should be considered as a simple “no strike clause” with the only difference being that it has a 
predetermined sanction; if we use this interpretation, it would create little problem, as the collective parties can 
freely choose the type of sanction to apply in the case of the breach of a collective agreement that will bind only 
the signatory parties. On the other hand, in its individual aspect (point 2), it should be considered superfluous, 
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because it is obvious that the contents of the collective agreement form part of the individual contract. If, 
however, it is intended to prevent the exercise of the right to strike of workers as individuals, we are facing a 
clear violation of Article 40 of the Constitution, which recognizes a fundamental right for workers that cannot be 
denied by the legislator and, even less so, by a collective agreement or an individual contract. 
 
 
5. A new paradigm: the labour market law 
The difficult situation that we are facing would suggest the approval of a “promotional” legislation in order to 
facilitate the relationship between trade unions and the different categories of workers in the enterprises; 
furthermore, there is an urgent need for a legislative intervention with the purpose of defining at least rules on 
how to measure the representativeness of trade unions, developing Article 39 of the Constitution. Both objectives 
seem to be absent from the political agenda of the Italian governments of the last decade, who have preferred 
to take advantage of this situation of crisis of representativeness of trade unions and have even strengthened 
the breakdown of trade unions’ unity which has made the workforce feel even more precarious.  
In the austerity era, starting in 2007 with the global financial crisis, Italian Labour Law seems to have resolved 
the tension between the principles of a system focused mostly on “employment” purposes and one aimed to 
protect the weaker parties of a contract by favouring the former. This view seems to switch the Labour Law into 
a “Labour market law”, based on a supposed influence of the law on occupational dynamics, and has generated 
social and generational tensions by widening the already existing gap between workers (Romagnoli 2013, 589): 
“strong” and “weak” employees, men and women, adults and the young. Italian legislation on Labour Law made 
the choice to create a multitude of contractual types functional to business interests and produced a multitude 
of social figures, which ultimately affected their individual behaviour, life expectancy and social perception. 
Since 2003 the Italian Labour Law has facilitated this phenomenon with the increasing use of “subjective 
causes”, especially for disadvantaged groups of workers in the labour market. The use of this legal technique is 
instrumental in creating various types of employment contracts whose aim is to create an increasing percentage 
of workers with fewer rights and lower salaries. Moreover, increasing the “subjective causes” designed for 
weaker groups can sometimes be considered a form of indirect discrimination (Santos Fernandez 2008, 689).  
Job insecurity is widespread among young people11 and the same lack of stability has “infected” their own lives, 
as highlighted by the increasingly low birth rates; couples often have children only after obtaining stability in their 
employment, a milestone that is achieved much later, and with less protections, in comparison to their parents’ 
generation. 
The social and employment condition of young people in Italy worsens further when other variables such as 
geography and gender are taken into account; in fact, employment rates find great differences between the 
northern and southern regions of the country and between men and women. In cases of young women, or people 
living in Southern Italy, the effects of the “strength of weak ties” are extremely visible, with employers opting for 
                                                 
11 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsi_emp_a&lang=en  
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precarious contracts with reduced rights rather than a standard contract which allow the termination of the 
employment without being subject to the (few remaining) rules for unfair dismissals. With the reform of 
dismissals, Renzi’s government completed this project of the precarisation of the Italian labour market 
(Romagnoli 2015, 3), because the effectiveness of labour rights is strictly related to the stability principle; 
moreover, his government achieved the objectives of EU austerity policies and seemed to send a clear message 
to employers: they no longer have excuses for not hiring but, at the same time, they have all the excuses that 
they can desire to dismiss an employee. 
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